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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL TAXATION AS AN EXERCISE
OF FEDERAL POLICE POWER
Enforcement of tax collection against sporadic wrongdoers, con-
tended Justice Black speaking for the minority in a recent case,1
will place the revenue service in the field of. imposing sanctions for
the commission of purely local crimes. He further argued that neither
the tax burden of honest citizens will be lightened, as more than
likely the cost of such litigation will far exceed the yield, nor was it
believable that Congress intended to treat occasional ill-gotten gains
as belonging to the wrongdoer so as to be taxable under a colorable
claim of right theory.
The whole of his argument might well be dismissed under a
"chamber of horrors" label, yet its cogency in a narrow area of
public policy is well worth more than passing attention. The opinion
emphasized the need for maintaining the efficiency of the tax system
and for protecting the local enforcement of criminal law, and com-
mented critically on the encroachment of federal law in the field of
local criminal law. Almost scornfully, it was said:2
The Government's brief is suggestive of the only other reason that
occurs to me- to give Washington more and more power to punish
purely local crimes such as embezzlement and extortion. Today's
decision illustrates an expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction into
fields of law enforcement heretofore wholly left to states and local
communities. I doubt if this expansion is wise from the standpoint
of the United States or the states.
1 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 72 S.Ct. 571, 96 L.Ed. 833
(1952). Rutkin was an ex-bootlegger of Prohibition days who managed to
extract a large sum of money from a former associate. The extraction occurred
over a number of years and culminated in 1943 when he was paid $250,000.
The petitioner omitted the latter sum from his income on the basis that it was
in payment for an alleged interest in a post-Prohibition liquor business. The
government charged that the money was extorted and was receipt of a gain
covered under INT. REV. CODE §22(a). The minority opinion noted that of
900 pages of oral testimony during the trial thirteen pages were devoted to
matters arising out of the tax question and the balance was given over to the
record of the rascality of the appellant. The conviction on charge of tax
evasion was affirmed 5-4. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct.
546, 90 L.Ed. 752 (1946), was distinguished and limited to its facts. The
minority opinion was written by Justice Black, and concurred in by Justices
Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas.
2 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 141, 72 S.Ct. 571, 96 L.Ed.
833 (1952).
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An exhausive exploration of the areas in -which federal taxation
has exerted influence, coerced action, or imposed punishment is be-
yond the scope of this endeavor. It is possible, however, to sketch
briefly the main fields in which taxation has acted, albeit secondarily,
to sanction some line of conduct considered undesirable.
I.
The first such area is that in which Congress has attempted by the
imposition of a tax, subsequently found wanting in constitutionality,
to control, eliminate, or punish the participation in a given activity.
Under the National Prohibition Act 3 it was provided that, upon
a finding that there was an illegal sale or manufacture of liquor in
violation of the statute, a tax was to be assessed and collected from
the person committing the violation double the amount provided by
the existing revenue act. 4 In addition, the violator was subject to a
penalty imposed upon him as a retailer or manufacturer. Needless to
say, the excise stamp required could not be issued prior to engaging
in the forbidden activity. It was the opinion of the Court that evi-
dence of a crime was prerequisite to the assessment of the tax, and
that Congress could not have "intended that penalties for crime
should be enforced through the secret findings and summary action
of executive officers," 5 even if carried out as revenue measures.
After the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, a restaurant oper-
ator in Birmingham, Alabama was tried for failure to purchase the
excise stamp required of retail liquor dealers operating in states
which still prohibited the liquor trade. 6 The Court found that the
imposition of the tax arose out of the commission of a crime and
that the amount of the tax was indicative of a penal and prohibitory
measure rather than one designed for revenue. "[T]he statute," said
the Court, "is a clear invasion of the police power, inherent in the
States, reserved from the grant of powers to the federal government
by the Constitution."' 7
Another act to which the term "tax" was applied did not become
a constitutional measure even though the aim of Congress was to
promote the highest good. The purpose was to eliminate the use of
3 41 STAT. 305, 317, 318 (1919).
4 REv. STAT. § 3244 (1875).
5 Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562, 42 S.Ct. 549, 66 L.Ed. 1061
(1922).
6 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 56 S.Ct. 223, 80 L.Ed.
233 (1935).
7 Id., 296 U.S. at 295, 296.
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child labor by imposing a tax on the profits of the products of such
labor.8 When this law was challenged, the Court declared that a
heavy exaction for a knowing departure from a specific norm of
business conduct amounting to ten per cent of the net profit of the
business was a penalty and therefore invalid.9
An enactment, which sought to give purchasing power to farmers
in parity with other economic classes, contained the proviso that it
was to be financed by a processing tax the funds of which were to be
allocated to the Secretary of Agriculture for the expansion of mar-
kets and removal of surplus agricultural products.1 0 It, too, was
struck down,1 1 for the reason that the solitary aim of the statute was
to regulate a matter wholly reserved to the states, and, further, that
taxation is an exaction for the maintenance of the government and
not of special groups. In the words of the Court:1 2
The exaction cannot be wrested out of its setting, denominated an
excise for raising revenue and legalized by ignoring its purpose as a
mere instrumentality for bringing about a desired end.
The amount offered [the farmer] is intended to be sufficient to
exert pressure on him to agree to the proposed regulation. The
power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to
coerce or destroy.
The principle expounded, however, did not arise unanimously from
the deliberative chambers of the Court. Justice Stone, speaking for
the minority, propounded the thesis that:13
. . . regulation, if any there be, is .accomplished not by the tax but
by the method by which its proceeds are expended, and would equally
be accomplished by any like use of public funds, regardless of
their source.
Yet, he further added: 14
The power to tax and spend is not without constitutional restraints.
One restriction is that the purpose must be truly national. Another
is that it may not be used to coerce action left to state control. An-
other is the conscience and patriotism of Congress and the Executive.
When an existing revenue act imposed a tax of two cents per $100
value of trade in futures transactions, and a subsequent enactment1 5
imposed a tax of twenty cents per bushel, the latter was held to be
8 40 STAT. 1138 (1919) (Child Labor Tax Law).
1 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 42 S.Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817 (1922).
10 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U.S.C. §601 (1946).
"I United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477
(1936).
1 Id., 297 U.S. at 61, 70-1.
'13 Id., 297 U.S. at 80.
14 Id., 297 U.S. at 87. Is it out of place at this moment to ask for the
judicial test that measures the validity of conscience and patriotism?
15 42 STAT. 187 (1921) (The Future Trading Act).
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an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power. It was inescapably
convincing that its purpose was to compel compliance with regula-
tions governing Boards of Trade and had no substantial relation
to tax collection.1 6
Nor did Congress choose the proper means to regulate the pro-
duction and distribution of coal by applying an excise tax of 15 per
cent on the sale price of coal at the mine, even though it was tem-
pered by a drawback allowance amounting to 13Y per cent.17 The
drawback was to be allowed on the condition that the producer
agree to and comply with regulations of a commission also set up
by the act. The Court found that the so-called tax clearly exacted
a penalty to coerce compliance:
1 8
One who does a thing in order to avoid a monetary penalty does
not agree; he yields to compulsion precisely the same as though he
did so to avoid a term in jail.
Since "penalty" has been a measure of constitutionality, a defini-
tion in the words of the Court itself should be of assistance : 19
The term "penalty" involves the idea of punishment for the infrac-
tion of the law, and is commonly used as including any extraordinary
liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person
wronged, not limited to the damages suffered.
Into this general area may fall a very recent case involving the
gambler's occupational tax imposed under the Revenue Act of
1951.20 The court, in holding the tax unconstitutional, followed the
general rule expounded in United States v. Constantine,2 ' and
quoted with approval the view of Justice Roberts to the effect that
under the cloak of a taxing act the intent was to usurp the states'
police power.22 On the other hand, in another case involving the
same tax, the opposite result was reached. 23 A scrutiny of the cases
cited in support of this latter decision leads to the opinion that the
court glossed over the obvious effort made to preserve the rule
of United States v. Constantine24 by the decision in United States v.
16 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 42 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed. 822 (1922).
17 49 STAT. 991 (1935).
18 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed.
1160 (1936).
9 O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 599, 58 L.Ed. 980
(1914).
20 65 STAT. 529 (1951), 26 U.S.C. §§3290-3291 (1952).
21 296 U.S. 287, 56 S.Ct. 223, 80 L.Ed. 233 (1935).
22 United States v. Kahriger, 105 F.Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
23 United States v. Smith, 106 F.Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
24 296 U.S. 287, 56 S.Ct. 223, 80 L.Ed. 233 (1935).
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Sanche, 2 5 and moreover bases its view of constitutionality, not
directly on the taxing power, but on the power to regulate interstate
commerce to which the taxing power is adjoined. The first decision
is now pending before the Supreme Court; whether or not it will
be upheld as a tax, and not classified as an unconstitutional sanc-
tion, remains to be seen.
II.
In spite of the conclusions which might be derived from the
material above, if an overriding moral suasion or element of public
policy be discerned in the imposition of "penalty" taxation, there will
not necessarily be found a want of constitutionality. For instance,
when Congress chose. to control traffic in narcotics2 6 by levying a
tax under the authority of the Constitution,2 7 it was possible to find
that it was basically a revenue measure to be administered with the
aim of enforcing the special tax.2 8 It was even admitted that the
object sought was to secure close supervision of dealings in drugs,
and that it made use of a penalty in order to obtain documentary
proof "as a means of taxing and restraining the traffic." 29 (Em-
phasis added.) Further, this tax has been sustained upon the prin-
ciple that: 
3 0
... from an early day the courit has held that the fact that other
motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not
authorize the courts to inquire into that subject.
Without much question the Court accomplished a noteworthy
task in steering the Harrison Narcotic Law through judicial waters
fraught with reefs. In doing so it found that ". .. the power to
lay taxes on an article includes no right to make any specific use of
such tax-paid article unlawful." 3 1
While the Court has said that "the statute must be strictly con-
25 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108, 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950).
26 38 STAT. 785 (1914), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 2550.(1946) (Harri-
son Narcotic Law).
27 U.S. CONST. Art. I, q 8.
21 Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 45 S.Ct. 446, 69 L.Ed. 819
(1925).
29 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed.
604 (1922).
30 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. 214, 216, 63 L.Ed.
493 (1919).
3L Blunt v. United States, 255 Fed. 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1918), cert.
denied, 249 U.S. 608, 39 S.Ct. 290, 63 L.Ed. 800 (1919).
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strued and not extended beyond the proper limits of a revenue meas-
ure," 3 2 on another occasion it added:33
• . . we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it
would be no law at all. If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulat-
ing and restraining the purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is
beyond the power of Congress and must be regarded as invalid ...
Over a quarter century before it became necessary to wrestle with
the problem of applying coercive taxation to narcotic drugs, Congress
enacted a law imposing discriminatory taxation upon oleomargarine.
It was stated that Congress, within its delegated power of taxation,
had the right to choose the objects upon which to impose an excise. 34
And an enactment does not lack constitutionality merely because it
accomplishes another purpose in addition to raising revenue.3 5
Though it was contended that a particular levy was a penalty the
purpose of which was to suppress traffic in certain noxious types of
firearms,3 6 and correspondingly subject to regulation only by the
powers reserved to the states, it was not so held. Rather it was de-
cided that -the deterrent effect arising out of a measure which on its
face was merely a taxing measure was not beyond congressional
power. The determinant propounded was that: 37
Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it inter-
poses an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared
with others not taxed. But a tax is not any the less a tax because
it has a regulatory effect ...
A progressive tax on theater tickets sold by brokers apart from
box office sales seriously threatened, according to the claimant, to
destroy such business. Yet, the Court of Claims, admitting that to be
the apparent aim of Congress, found no ground sufficient to make
the act unconstitutional. 38 Long before the Congress gave thought
to theater tickets, it deliberately sought to drive out of existence the
circulation of notes of private persons, state banks and state banking
associations by the imposition of a tax.39 It was decided that in the
32 Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 19, 45 S.Ct. 446, 69 L.Ed. 819
(1925).
33 Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 341, 48 S.Ct. 388, 72 L.Ed.
600 (1928).
34 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78
(1904).
35 In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 17 S.Ct. 444, 41 L.Ed. 813 (1897).
-3 48 STAT. 1236 (1934) (National Firearm Act).
37 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513, 57 S.Ct. 554, 81 L.Ed.
772 (1937).
38 Couthoui v. United States, 54 F.(2d) 158 (Ct. Cl. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 548, 52 S.Ct. 396, 76 L.Ed. 939 (1939).
39 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L.Ed. 482 (U.S. 1869).
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exercise of an undisputed constitutional power to provide a nation-
wide currency, Congress was fully within its power to restrain by
taxation the circulation of any but its own currency.
One of the problems confronting Congress in its imposition of
taxes arises when the revenue measure is coupled with the exercise of
another power. If the exercise of the other power is constitutional,
the Court tends to sustain the tax, as in Veazie Bank v. Fenno.40
But if the other power fails, so may the taxation. Thus, in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.,41 since the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 was held to be an invalid exercise of the power to regulate inter-
state commerce, its accompanying tax was resultingly nullified. In
the second Bituminous Coal Act,42 however, Congress selected the
proper means of regulating the sale of bituminous coal as it effected
interstate commerce, and 'correspondingly, the tax, which in sub-
stance imposed one rate for members of the code complying with
the regulations, and another rate for non-members, was deemed a
valid excise. In these circumstances, the Court found:43
Clearly this tax is not designed merely for revenue purposes. In
purpose and effect it is primarily a sanction to enforce the regulatory
provisions of the Act. . . . The power of taxation, granted to Con-
gress by the Constitution, may be utilized as a sanction for the exer-
cise of another power which is granted it.
In United States v. Butler,4 4 the regulation of agriculture coupled
with a tax also aimed at coercing compliance was extensively distin-
guished in the case testing the validity of Titles III and IX of the
Social Security Act,4 5 which imposed a tax upon employers of eight
or more persons for unemployment compensation purposes. The ob-
jections in the Butler case were deemed not applicable according to
the findings of the Court:46
(a) The proceeds of the tax in controversy are not earmarked
for a special group.
(b) The unemployment compensation law which is a condition
of the credit has had the approval of the state and could not be a
law without it.
(c) The condition is not linked to an irrevocable agreement, for
the state at its pleasure may repeal its unemployment law . . . termin-
40 Ibid.
41 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936).
42 50 STAT. 72 (1937).
43 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393, 60 S.Ct.
907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940).
44 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936).
45 49 STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1305 (1946).
46 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 592-593, 57 S.Ct. 883,
81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937).
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ate the credit, and place itself where it was before the credit was
accepted.
(d) The condition is not directed to the attainment of an unlaw-
ful end, but to in end, the relief of unemployment, for which nation
and state may lawfully cooperate.
The statute does not call for a surrender by the states of powers
essential to their quasi-sovereign existence.
-It may be noted under (a) that reference is made to earmarking
funds for a special group, a serious objection in United States v.
Butler.4 7 Nevertheless, a processing tax4 8 imposed on coconut oil
derived from the Philippine Islands, to be held as a separate fund
for the Treasury of the Philippines was declared a legal tax.4 9 The
Court reasoned that since it would be valid for a separate appropria-
tion to be made out of the general funds of the United States Treas-
ury, it was not invalid where the tax and the appropriation were
bound to one another in the same legislative act.
III.
Thus far we have explored the areas in which taxation has been
held either unconstitutional because it coerces or sanctions, or con-
stitutional irrespective of its regulatory or prohibitive effect. There is
also a never-never land in which a revenue measure may be called a
"penalty" or described in terms implying punishment without the
question of validity being decided.
The importation of wood pulp, declared for customs purposes at
less than the taxable market value, was not only subject to the im-
portation duty, but also to a further sum based on such undervalua-
tion. The additional sum was found to, be a penalty. It was not
imposed, the Court said, for revenue purposes, but, rather, it was
exacted in addition to the import duties and for the particular act,
i.e., the act of undervaluation. As a penalty it was found to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts for adjudica-
tion.50
The imposition of an additional sum, equal to fifty per cent of a
tax deficiency, due to fraud with intent to evade the tax was not res
47 297 U.S. 1. 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936).
48 48 STAT. 680, 763 (1934).
49 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 57 S.Ct. 764,
81 L.Ed. 1122 (1937).
50 Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 23 S.Ct. 427, 47 L.Ed. 614
(1903).
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judicata because the taxpayer previously had been acquitted on
charges of criminal evasion of the income tax. Rather, the addition
was regarded as a legitimate civil sanction aimed at the protection
of the revenues. 5 1
That a revenue measure may be used to ensnare a willful wrong-
doer whose wiles and power seem to forestall bringing him to account
on other grounds is well known. Recall the "sad" plight of gangsters
and racketeers, immune so long from sanction for violation of local
criminal statutes, who are eventually caught up in the meshes of tax
evasion. This point was aptly covered in Steinberg v. United States:
5 2
• . common knowledge of prosecuting methods, and the comment
of the court in sentencing this man clearly show that Steinberg was
indicted, not to enforce a revenue law, nor penalize him for failing
to comply with one, but to punish severely for dealing largely in
liquor . . wherefore, as Congress has furnished weapons appro-
pnate for frontal attack only against small fry, endeavor is made to
net the larger fish in the meshes of revenue, customs, and tax laws,
with the ever-useful conspiracy statute in reserve for a plurality of
wrongdoers. The question is not whether this is wise or politic, fair
or in good taste, but whether it can legally be done. We think it
can under the language of the statutes ...
IV.
At the outset reference was made to the extension of federal police
power foreseen by Justice Black, implicit in the application of federal
taxation as punishment for purely, local crimes. The question remains
to be answered as to how far taxation may be extended for ulterior
purposes before it will be found invalid.
The existence of an ulterior or collateral purpose in taxation is, in
itself, not sufficient to establish invalidity. Nor is the fact that Con-
gress absolutely forbids something a bar to taxing the very same
thing, for as Justice Holmes said, "Of course Congress may tax what
it also forbids." 53 And as the Court has reiterated time and time
again, congressional motive underlying legislative enactment is not
a proper subject for judicial inquiry,5 4 except, of course, in those
circumstances when inquiry is made.5 5 Yet, even when the question
of motive is raised, "Legislative draftsmen have learned to preserve
51 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917
(1938).
52 14 F.(2d) 564, 566-7 (2d Cir. 1926).
53 United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 480, 43 S.Ct. 197, 67 L.Ed.
358 (1923).
54 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. 214, 63 L.Ed. 493
(1919); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L.Ed. 482 (U.S. 1869).
5 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477
(1936).
